This paper considers a simple model of a firm's name choice. A main prediction of the model, that the content of a firm's name will be correlated with its service quality under certain conditions, belies the intuition that a firm's freely chosen name will represent only "cheap talk" about itself. Using unique data from markets for residential plumbing services, the model's main result is confirmed empirically: plumbing firms with names that begin with an "A" or a number receive more than five times as many complaints regarding poor service, on average. Two additional equilibrium implications also hold in this setting: firms that attempt to conceal their reputations by using multiple names receive even more complaints and firms with names that begin with an "A" or a number have higher prices. Finally, these results are extended to paid listings on Internet search engines. Firms that advertise on Google receive more complaints, all else equal, which casts doubt on the validity of sorting equilibria commonly used in the theoretical literature on position auctions. * This paper has benefited from many helpful conversations with Heski Bar-Isaac,
Introduction
Firms often choose names that convey information to consumers. For instance, firms claim to provide high-quality service by including the word "quality" or "best" in their names, or to offer low prices by calling themselves "discount" providers. When consumers cannot verify the claims implied by firms' names, however, they might dismiss them as cheap talk. This paper considers circumstances under which a firm's name signals meaningful information about itself. The simple model of consumer search and firm name choice presented below yields a separating equilibrium under certain conditions in which low-quality firms use one type of name and high-quality firms use another.
The model's main predictions are tested in the market for residential plumbing services. In this setting, the typical consumer enlists the services of a plumber infrequently and selects one without utilizing much information other than the business' name. In response, many plumbing firms strategically choose names to attract potential customers. In the city of Chicago, for instance, approximately 21% of plumbing firms use names that begin with an "A" or a number, such as A-AAAA Sewer & Drains and AAAA Scott's Plumbing. Intuitively, plumbing firms choose this type of name to appear near the beginning of the plumbing category in the Yellow Pages, which increases their chances of being contacted by potential consumers who search the directory by starting with the first listing. Because firms freely choose their names, however, the benefits from using a name that begins with an "A" or a number must come with tradeoffs. If they did not, all firms would prefer to use such a name.
With this as motivation, a stylized model that incorporates the relationship between a name's content and its position in a directory is considered below. In the model, a firm faces the opportunity cost of not attracting consumers with high relative search costs if it uses a particular type of name. If consumers with low relative search costs are more profitable for high-quality firms than low-quality ones, firms will prefer to sort by quality by choosing different types of names. In a market with heterogeneous consumers and firms such as residential plumbing services, this is likely to be the case: infrequent customers with small projects (e.g., a homeowner with a broken pipe) will not find searching as worthwhile as customers with elaborate or recurring projects (e.g., a landlord with many broken pipes). At the same time, a low-quality plumber will not benefit as much from attracting a customer with many future projects because he will not satisfy the customer initially and will not be recommissioned. A high-quality plumber, on the other hand, will prefer not to attract infrequent customers with small projects if doing so costs him the opportunity to work for a customer with the potential for many future projects. As a result, the name a firm uses can be correlated with the quality of service it provides even when consumers cannot verify the claims implied by the firm's name ex ante. Moreover, consumers rationally choose firms based on their names and commensurate prices, even in the absence of information about firm quality. Under mild assumptions, the presence of search costs and heterogeneous consumers results in equilibrium sorting behavior by firms.
The model's main predictions hold empirically in the market for residential plumbing services:
plumbing firms in Illinois with names that begin with an "A" or a number receive more than five times as many complaints with the Better Business Bureau, on average. In this sense, the type of name a firm uses signals credible information to consumers even though a low-quality firm could disguise itself as a high-quality firm by using a different type of name. Firms that do attempt to conceal their identities by concurrently using both types of names provide starkly worse service:
plumbing firms in Illinois that use both a name that begins with an "A" or a number and a name that does not receive more than fifteen times as many complaints, on average.
The type of name a firm chooses also has implications for its pricing policies. The sorting equilibrium considered below predicts that firms with lower-ordered names will command higher prices than firms with higher-ordered ones, which is consistent with ordered search models where prices decline with the order a firm is searched because consumers require incentives to make costly searching worthwhile (Arbatskaya 2007) . Again, the model's implications hold empirically.
The findings from a unique price survey of plumbing firms in Illinois show that firms with names beginning with an "A" or a number are more likely to charge a fixed service fee and to have higher prices overall. Specifically, firms serving metro Chicago that use a name that begins with an "A" or a number command an 8.4% price premium, all else equal.
While traditional Yellow Pages sort names alpha-numerically, other types of search platforms do not necessarily follow this convention. For instance, Internet search engines such as Google list firms concurrently using proprietary algorithms for the left-hand side of their search results, and using position auctions for the top and right-hand side. The conditions that lead firms to sort by quality, however, also exist in this setting. While a common and striking result of the theoretical position auction literature is that advertising firms will be of higher quality than non-advertising firms, this prediction does not hold in the market for plumbing services: plumbing firms that advertise on Google receive more than thirteen times as many complaints, on average. Intuitively, this result can be explained by the relative value each type of firm places on consumers who use Google to search for plumbers. Once again, because low-quality firms cannot attract customers through referrals or repeat business, they rely comparatively more on infrequent customers with high search costs. As a result, low-quality plumbing firms have a greater incentive to be among the top paid listings on Google, just as they have a greater incentive to choose names that would make them among the top listings in offline Yellow Pages. In this sense, the incentives for firms are identical across the two platforms, and the efficiency gains often speculated to arise from position auctions have not occurred in this particular case. This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, it studies the economic implications of names. Previous work has considered many topics related to names, such as name trading (Tadelis 1999) , labor market outcomes (Einav & Yariv 2006 , Fryer Jr & Levitt 2004 , Bertrand & Mullainathan 2004 , voting behavior (Meredith & Salant 2007) , and stock price returns (Cooper et al. 2001) . No previous work (to my knowledge) has considered a model in which a firm's name is a primitive strategic choice variable and tested its equilibrium implications empirically.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on firm reputation.
1 A number of theoretical papers have examined the relationship between a firm's name and its reputation, including Tadelis (1999 Tadelis ( , 2003 , Cremer (1986) , Kreps (1990) , and Mailath & Samuelson (2001) . To motivate the primary research questions addressed in this strand of literature, consider the recent decisions made by AIG and GMAC Bank to change their names -to AIU and Ally Bank, respectively -following events that tarnished their reputations. This behavior arises naturally within the reputation literature in the sense that poor performance by a firm will cause its name (reputation) to lose value because consumers rely on a firm's track record to update their beliefs regarding the firm's quality. Once the value falls far enough, a firm will prefer to discontinue or change its name and start with a clean record with the hope of exploiting the ignorance of consumers as to who exactly is behind the new name. This paper considers a related question: Can the content of a firm's name signal credible information to consumers about its reputation?
Relatedly, this paper also contributes to the sparse empirical literature on the relationship between a firm's reputation and its name. Two recent papers within this vein are Cabral & Hortacsu (2010) , who provide evidence that sellers on eBay (where a user name is associated with a seller's reputation) are more likely to exit after receiving negative feedback, and McDevitt (2010), who finds that plumbing firms that receive complaints are more likely to change their names. In a similar spirit, this paper establishes an empirical relationship between the content of firms' names and their reputations.
Third, this paper contributes to the literature on signaling. An extensive body of work has considered circumstances under which firms can credibly signal information about themselves, such as Milgrom & Roberts (1986) , Bagwell & Riordan (1991), and Wolinsky (1983) . More closely related to the objectives of this paper, Shin (2005) develops a model in which advertisements
with vague information about a firm's prices can nevertheless provide meaningful information to consumers. When a firm incurs costs to sell a product, either directly or in the form of opportunity costs, attracting the wrong mix of consumers by sending an inappropriate signal yields lower profits for the firm. As a result, firms have no incentive to mislead consumers with their signals, and hence an equilibrium can obtain under certain conditions in which firms separate by choosing different advertising strategies given their types. A similar intuition governs the name choices of plumbing firms in the model considered below.
Finally, this paper contributes to the theoretical work on consumer search. Specifically, Armstrong et al. (2009) examine the effects of prominence in search markets in which one firm is sampled first by all consumers. In their model, the firm with the highest-quality product has the greatest incentive to become prominent, which increases both consumer surplus and welfare.
Relatedly, a growing theoretical literature has studied position auctions for advertisements on Internet search engines. For instance, Chen & He (2006) and Athey & Ellison (2009) develop models in which position auctions are welfare enhancing for consumers because high-quality firms submit higher bids for favorable listings on Internet search engines, which then enables consumers to search more efficiently. In contrast to these theoretical results, plumbing firms that advertise on Google receive more complaints, on average. In this setting, the sorting equilibria proposed in the position auction literature is not consistent with the observed market outcomes.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 develops a stylized model of firm name choice and consumer search, and analyzes a separating equilibrium. Section 3 discusses the data used to test the model's predictions. Section 4 describes the empirical setting of the analysis. Section 5 presents the results from reduced-form estimates of the model. Section 6
provides an extension to Internet position auctions. Section 7 concludes.
Model
To fix intuition, a stylized model of consumer and firm behavior is presented below. Under certain conditions, a sorting equilibrium obtains in which low-quality firms choose one type of name and attract consumers with small (or infrequent) projects who do not search, while high-quality firms choose a different type of name and attract consumers with large (or frequent) projects who do search.
Setup Consider a market for a service supplied by two types of firms, L and H. Each firmtype successfully provides the service with probability λ j , with 0 < λ L < λ H < 1. Two types of consumers demand the service, S and R. Each consumer-type has a project size, T i , with 1 ≤ T S < T R . Consumers receive utility T i from a successfully completed project, and 0 otherwise.
Firms can choose one of two types of names, A and Z. Consumers select firms based on their name-type. Consumers can contact an A-type name at no cost (i.e., no search), but must pay a search cost of C > 0 to contact a Z-type name.
Because consumers cannot distinguish among firms within a given name-type, prices depend only on the name of the firm, with A-types charging P A > 0 per unit of service and Z-types charging P Z > 0. Payment is composed of a fixed service charge, P n , and a contingent portion that is paid upon the successful completion of the project. 2 That is, payment is P n + T i * P n if the project is completed successfully, and P n otherwise.
Sorting Equilibrium Given this structure, the following four conditions represent a sorting equilibrium in which L-type firms choose A-type names and H-type firms choose Z-type names, while consumers make rational search decisions such that S-type consumers select firms using A-type names and R-type consumers prefer to search for firms that use Z-type names:
It is easily verified that compatible parameters satisfying these four conditions exist and yield the following proposition:
Proposition 1 In a sorting equilibrium that satisfies Conditions 1 -4, P A ≥ P Z .
The proof is straightforward. Suppose
This contradicts Condition 4.
Intuitively, Condition 1 implies that R-type consumers prefer to search for an H-type firm using a Z-type name because the lower price charged by these firms and the greater likelihood of success outweigh the costs of searching. At the same time, Condition 2 implies that S-type consumers, because of their smaller projects, do not benefit enough from the lower price and greater probability of success from selecting an H-type firm using a Z-type name to justify bearing the costs of search. Moreover, firms find sorting by name optimal because L-type firms prefer the larger fixed service charge associated with A-type names due to the smaller chance that they will successfully complete the project and receive the contingent portion of their contract.
On the other hand, H-type firms are willing to accept the lower price commensurate with a Z-type name because they benefit comparatively more from larger projects due to the greater likelihood that they will complete the project successfully.
Discussion While stylized, the model reflects several details of the market for plumbing services well. Many customers require a plumber infrequently and for small projects, such as when a pipe breaks in their house. This type of customer has little incentive to search extensively for a plumber, as his project is minor enough that most licensed plumbers can complete it successfully and the variation in prices across plumbers for a project of this size will not be large enough to justify requesting multiple bids. A customer of this type seems likely to limit his search to the first few listings in the Yellow Pages.
Other customers require a plumber more often or for more elaborate projects, such as a landlord who is responsible for the plumbing in several apartments. This type of customer has more incentive to search for a high-quality plumber with lower marginal prices, and is not likely to restrict his search to the first listing in the Yellow Pages.
Each type of plumber, due to the differences in their abilities, prefers to attract a different type of customer. Because the low-quality plumber cannot satisfy a customer with an elaborate project and will not receive any recurring business from his customers, he prefers to capitalize on the higher prices paid by consumers with small projects for whom searching is not worthwhile. A high-quality plumber, on the other hand, does not want to attract many low-frequency customers with small projects because he would forgo the opportunity to generate repeat business or receive the contingent portion from a larger project if he is already engaged with a small project. Highquality plumbers prefer to "de-market" to the high relative search cost customers who would be most likely to call one of the first few listings in the Yellow Pages when looking for a plumber, and do so by choosing a name that appears farther down in the plumbing category.
Other market conditions will result in a pooling equilibrium in which names do not convey meaningful information. When consumers have low search costs, for example, searching becomes worthwhile for all types and sorting behavior by firms cannot hold in equilibrium. In this case, no consumer would contact a name associated with a low-quality firm, and low-quality firms would not prefer to signal their type by using a distinguishable name. Likewise, if
are too large, pooling of firm-types across names will obtain.
Extension to Multiple Names The qualitative results of this model extend naturally to a setting in which firms can use more than one name, as is observed in the plumbing markets considered below. To see this intuitively, consider a very low-quality firm that derives the majority of its revenue from fixed service fees (i.e., the firm does not often perform well and is fired before completing the project, receiving no referrals or repeat customers). This firm is indifferent about the type of customer it attracts so long as it attracts many of them and collects their fixed service charges. High-quality firms, on the other hand, face an opportunity cost of attracting infrequent customers with small projects, as they must forgo the chance to attract a customer who would yield more business over time if they are already committed to a project. As long as the number of bad plumbers pooling with good plumbers on certain names is not too high so as to sufficiently degrade consumers' benefits from searching, a partial-sorting result will still hold.
That is, bad plumbers will use several names, while good plumbers will still prefer to use only one, higher-ordered name.
Testable Implications The stylized model presented above yields three main results to test empirically:
Implication 1 Under certain market conditions, low-quality firms will choose lower-ordered names, while high-quality firms will choose higher-ordered names.
Implication 2 Under certain market conditions, low-quality firms will operate with several names, while high-quality firms will use only one, higher-ordered name.
Implication 3 In a sorting equilibrium, firms using lower-ordered names will charge higher prices than firms using higher-ordered names.
In Section 5, the market for residential plumbing services in Illinois is used to test whether these implications hold empirically.
Data
Data for the empirical analysis of this paper have been brought together from several sources.
Data for all plumbing firms operating in Illinois were downloaded from the web-based version of Several approaches were used to determine which plumbing firms in Illinois use more than one name. First, names listed in ReferenceUSA were matched to a common owner using phone numbers, fax numbers, websites, and addresses to generate an initial list of aliases among the universe of plumbing firms. In addition, names were linked to one another using the known aliases listed in the Better Business Bureau record for each firm, when available. Finally, all firms listed in ReferenceUSA were surveyed by phone and several firms were found to use more than one name during the course of the survey.
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Two processes were used to verify the preliminary matches. First, firms must register their names with the Illinois Secretary of State, and all matches were confirmed on the department's website. 6 Second, potential matches were verified during the phone surveys. As a result of these measures, the 2,670 names listed in ReferenceUSA were linked to 2,293 independent firms.
In the event that a firm had more than one name, its firm-level variables from ReferenceUSA and the Better Business Bureau were constructed by summing over the variables for employees, advertising expenditures, and complaints listed for all of its names. 7 In addition, a firm's years in operation is assumed to be the maximum age of all the names listed for the firm and that a firm serves the metro-Chicago area if at least one of the names belonging to the firm does. Many consumers search listings in the Yellow Pages in a top-down manner (Lohse 1997) . As a result, some businesses exploit the search behavior of consumers by choosing names that place them near the top of their categories. Intuitively, one might suspect that this tendency will be more prevalent in categories that attract the most usage in the Yellow Pages, which are presented in Table 1 .
As shown in Figure 1, In certain categories, however, consumers rely more extensively on firms' listings in the Yellow
Pages when searching for a provider. For businesses offering home service, for example, the physical location of the business does not affect a consumer's choice, as she no longer bears a transportation cost for obtaining the service. Consequently, spatial differentiation does not influence a consumer's choice of a firm, so other firm characteristics -including its namebecome relatively more important for attracting customers. Consistent with this intuition, the top home-service categories in the Yellow Pages, as shown in Table 2 , have a larger proportion of firms with names that begin with an "A" or a number, as shown in Figure 2 . In Illinois, 14.4% of businesses in these categories use names that begin with an "A" or a number, significantly above the statewide average of 8.3%. Moreover, categories among the top-fifteen home-service markets that are more likely to rely on repeated interactions with customers -lawn maintenance and landscaping services -have relatively fewer businesses that use names beginning with an "A" or a number: only 8.3%, just in line with the state average.
Firms' names also vary by their tenures in the market. As shown in Figure 3 , 35% of new entrants in home-service categories use names beginning with an "A" or a number in the city of Chicago, which compares to an average of 10% across all categories. Intuitively, this result can be explained by the different manners by which nascent and established firms attract customers.
Namely, a firm's reputation affects its revenue through repeat business and referrals. A new entrant, however, will not have an extant track record from which to attract customers, and thus must rely on other methods to draw clientele. One such strategy would be to choose a name that would put its business near the beginning of the listings in its Yellow Pages category, as this listing will be viewed more often by potential customers. belong to local unions that provide benefits to their members, such as pensions and health insurance, in exchange for dues, and also set union wage rates.
The summary statistics for the plumbing firms appearing in the ReferenceUSA data are presented in Table 3 . The majority of plumbing firms in Illinois are small businesses, with over 70% employing fewer than four people. The median age of firms is 10 years, while 23.3% of firms have been in operation for over twenty-five years. Firms that use a name that begins with an "A" or a number differ across many observable characteristics when compared to firms that do not, as shown in Table 4 . Firms that use a name that begins with an "A" or a number are younger, spend more on advertising, and are more likely to serve metro Chicago, on average. Importantly, firms that use names that begin with an "A" or a number do not have more employees than other firms, on average. This suggests that firms that use names that begin with an "A" or a number do not consistently receive more business than other firms due to the capacity constraints of individual plumbers. For this reason, the fact that firms that use names that begin with an "A" or a number receive more complaints, even after controlling for employee levels, suggests that they provide lower-quality service.
An interesting feature of the market for plumbing services is that firms can use more than one name. For instance, note in Figure 4 that this firm, linked clearly by its plumbing license in the two advertisements, uses at least four distinct names. As such, the decision to operate with multiple names also represents an important detail to consider when analyzing firms' name choices. Because the decision to use more than one name is potentially correlated with other firm characteristics, such as the desire to disassociate from past failures or to have more listings in the Yellow Pages with which to attract customers, this choice might also convey meaningful information to consumers about a firm's unobserved quality.
Using the methods described in Section 3, it was determined that the majority of firms (over 90%) use only one name in Illinois, while 228 firms use more than one. The firms that use multiple names are demonstrably different than firms that use only one name, as shown in Table 5 . Firms that use more than one name have more employees, are older, spend more on advertising in the Yellow Pages, and are more likely to serve metro Chicago, on average. In terms of quality, firms that use more than one name receive significantly more complaints, on average, than those that do not. In addition, approximately 38.6% of firms that use more than one name have at least one that begins with an "A" or a number, compared with 10.0% for firms that use only one name.
Also of note are the conditional summary statistics for firms that use more than one name and use at least one that begins with an "A" or a number presented in Table 6 . This group of firms receives even more complaints, on average.
Finally, the summary statistics from the results of the price survey are presented in Table 7 .
Notably, firms' pricing policies appear correlated with their name choices. As shown in Table   8 , firms that use at least one name that begins with an "A" or a number are more likely to charge a fixed service fee, have higher fixed fees and hourly rates, and charge more overall for a two-hour project that incorporates both a fixed fee and an hourly rate.
13 One interpretation of these findings is that firms with lower positions in the Yellow Pages can exploit the high relative search costs of customers by charging higher prices, which is discussed at length in the following section.
Results
To analyze the relationship between the quality of service a firm provides and its name choice, this section considers a series of regressions that measure the correlation between the content of a firm's name and the number of complaints filed against it with the Better Business Bureau.
Following this analysis of firm quality, the relationship between a firm's name and the price it charges for its services is examined.
Quality To test the primary hypothesis of this paper, that firms using names that begin with an "A" or a number provide lower-quality service, a regression of the following form is considered:
where the dependent variable, y j , is the number of complaints filed against a firm with the Better Business Bureau; A j is an indicator variable equal to one if the firms uses a name that begins with an "A" or a number; M j is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm uses more than one name; X j is other firm-specific variables such as its advertising expenditures, employee levels, years in operation, and service area; and ε j is the error term.
Due to the over-disperssed count nature of the Better Business Bureau complaints data, a negative binomial regression is used for estimation.
14 The results from a series of such regressions are presented in Table 9 . In Specification (1), the number of complaints filed against a firm is shown to be positively correlated with the number of workers it employs and the amount it spends on advertising in the Yellow Pages. Older firms receive fewer complaints, though the difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Finally, firms serving the metro-Chicago area receive more complaints than firms outside the metro area.
In Specification (2), Implication 1 from Section 2 is confirmed: firms that use at least one name that begins with an "A" or a number receive more complaints. To interpret the marginal effect of using this type of name, note that the incident rate ratio for firms that use at least one name that begins with an "A" or a number is approximately 3.379, meaning that these firms receive 237.9% more complaints than other firms, all else equal. The qualitative interpretation of the remaining controls in Specification (2) is the same as in Specification (1).
A control for firms that use more than one name is included in Specification (3). As predicted by Implication 2, using multiple names is associated with receiving 357.1% more complaints, all else equal. 15 Controlling for firms that use more than one name reduces the marginal effect of having at least one name that begins with an "A" or a number, bringing the incident rate ratio to 2.0, though the effect remains statistically significant (p < 0.01). The qualitative interpretation of the remaining controls in Specification (3) is the same as in Specifications (1) and (2).
Finally, Specification (4) includes a control for firms that use more than one name and have at least one that begins with an "A" or a number. The interaction term that is equal to one if a firm has more than one name and at least one of its names begins with an "A" or a number is positive but not statistically significant at conventional levels. Including this control does not affect the qualitative interpretation of the remaining explanatory variables.
In short, these regressions demonstrate that a statistically significant correlation exists between the content of a firm's name and the quality of service it provides, as predicted by the model in Section 2. Firms that use a name that begins with an "A" or a number provide lowerquality service, all else equal, which is consistent with Implication 1. In addition, firms that use more than one name receive even more complaints, which is consistent with Implication 2.
Quality by Market Size While not derived explicitly from the model, the relationship between a firm's name and its service quality might depend on the size of its market. For instance, firms in smaller markets might rely comparatively less on the signaling effects of low-ordered names, which would be consistent with the stylized fact from Section 4 that relatively fewer firms use names beginning with an "A" or a number outside of metro Chicago than within it.
To explore this possibility, Table 10 presents the results from a series of regressions restricted to firms that do not serve the metro-Chicago area. As shown in Specification (2), firms outside of metro Chicago that use at least one name that begins with an "A" or a number receive 282.4% more complaints, all else equal. When controlling for firms that use more than one name in
Specification (3), however, the effect of having a name that begins with an "A" or a number is no longer statistically significant. In this sense, the content of a firm's name is not as indicative of the quality of service a firm provides outside the metro area, as the variation in complaints is explained primarily by firms that use more than one name in these markets. Intuitively, this result can be explained by the fact that firms benefit comparatively less from a lower position in the Yellow Pages in less-crowded markets. That is, a firm that uses a name that begins with a "B" is still contacted by consumers with relatively high search costs in these markets. This result is also consistent with the search behavior of consumers for plumbers in rural markets who might rely comparatively more on referrals than the Yellow Pages to locate providers. At the same time, a correlation between a firm's quality and decision to use more than one name still exists in rural markets because this measure is conflated with the firm's reputational concerns;
after establishing a reputation for poor quality, a firm will prefer to conceal its identity by using another name, a dynamic phenomenon beyond the scope of this paper but considered in McDevitt (2010).
In Table 11 , the same series of regressions is considered for firms that do serve the metroChicago area. The results from Specification (2) indicate that firms within metro Chicago that use at least one name that begins with an "A" or a number receive 270.9% more complaints, all else equal. When controlling for firms that use more than one name in Specification (3), the effect of having a name that begins with an "A" or a number is still positive and statistically significant, which contrasts with the effects outside of metro Chicago. In this sense, the signal a firm sends by using a name that begins with an "A" or a number matters comparatively more in metro Chicago, even after controlling for those firms that use more than one name.
Price As implied by the model in Section 2, a relationship exists between a firm's name and its price-setting behavior. The relationship is likely endogenous in the sense that a firm will choose a lower-ordered name to exploit consumers' search behaviors by charging higher prices, and its decision will depend on the firm's other unobserved characteristics, such as its ability. To examine this result empirically, a series of OLS regressions of the form
is considered, where the price a firm quoted for a representative two-hour project, y j , is the dependent variable. The results are presented in Table 12 , with Specification (1) providing evidence consistent with Implication 3: firms that use a name that begins with an "A" or a number charge higher prices, all else equal. In this specification, firms that use at least one name that begins with an "A" or a number command a $21.05 premium, which is 8.4% above the mean in metro Chicago when other explanatory variables are fixed at their mean levels. This result is in line with the standard prediction of ordered-search models that prices will decline with the order a firm is searched because consumers require an incentive in the form of lower prices to make searching worthwhile.
Specifications (2) and (3) include controls for firms that use more than one name, and the qualitative interpretation of the results does not change. Furthermore, Specifications (4) - (6) include the number of complaints filed against the firm with the Better Business Bureau as an explanatory variable. The results from these regressions suggest that firms with more complaints charge lower prices, all else equal, which is consistent with quality-adjusted prices. about the quality of sponsored links which allows consumers to search more efficiently." A main implication of their model is that firms that advertise on Google are of higher quality than firms that do not, with their conception of quality being that a firm meets the needs of the consumer conducting the search. For a setting such as plumbing services, a reasonable interpretation of the needs of consumers is that the plumber provides adequate service, i.e., that the service will not lead to a complaint filed with the Better Business Bureau.
To empirically test this prediction of the theoretical position auction literature and its connection to offline search platforms, the data from ReferenceUSA and the Better Business Bureau were merged with plumbing-related search results from Google, as discussed in Section 3. The summary statistics for the plumbing firms that advertise on Google are presented in Table 13 .
On average, firms that advertise on Google have more employees, spend more on advertising in the Yellow Pages, are more likely to serve the metro-Chicago area, are more likely to use at least one name that begins with an "A" or a number, and are more likely to use more than one name.
In terms of quality, firms that advertise on Google receive more than thirteen times as many complaints, on average, and receive more than three times as many complaints per employee.
The results from a negative binomial regression in which the dependent variable is the number of complaints filed against the firm are presented in Table 14 . As shown in Specification (1), firms that advertise on Google receive 205.2% more complaints, all else equal. The qualitative interpretation of the remaining explanatory variables is equivalent to the interpretation discussed in Section 5. In Specifications (2) - (4), other controls related to firms' names are included and their qualitative results remain similar to those in Specification (1).
Because plumbing firms that advertise on Google provide lower-quality service, the primary implication of the high-quality sorting equilibria derived in the position auction literature -that firms that appear among the sponsored links are more likely to meet the needs of consumers than firms that do not advertise on Google -does not hold in the market for residential plumbing services. The model derived in Section 2 provides the intuition for this result: low-quality firms cannot attract loyal repeat customers and instead must rely on infrequent customers with high search costs who disproportionately search for plumbers on Internet search engines. High-quality firms, on the other hand, prefer to avoid this type of customer in favor of clients who will yield longer, more-lucrative relationships. 17 In this sense, the presumed efficiency gains attributed to online search platforms vis-a-vis traditional offline media should not be universally accepted. The incentives for firms in many markets are the same across the two platforms, and yield the same relationship between position and quality.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that the type of name a firm uses can signal credible information about its quality. In the market for residential plumbing services in Illinois, plumbing firms that use a name that begins with an "A" or a number provide lower-quality service. The model developed above rationalizes this result. Consumers with high search costs relative to the scopes of their projects settle for low-quality plumbers, while consumers with low relative search costs expend greater effort to find high-quality plumbers. Low-quality plumbers prefer to self-select names that attract high relative search cost customers because they cannot attract loyal repeat customers.
High-quality plumbers, on the other hand, use names that do not attract high relative search cost customers because they benefit comparatively more from more-extensive projects and from building a loyal customer base.
These results have implications for the price-setting behavior of firms in this market. Firms that strategically use names that place them at the beginning of the plumbing category in the Yellow Pages command higher prices. This result is consistent with the model derived above, as well as with many common theoretical models of consumer search. Intuitively, consumers require an incentive to search, and in this case consumers search because doing so allows them to locate firms that charge lower prices and provide higher-quality service.
This paper has also contributed to the literature on search engine position auctions by providing empirical evidence that the efficiency gains predicted to arise from this platform have not occurred in the setting considered here. While the position auction literature suggests that listings will be sorted from high to low quality, the converse holds for residential plumbing services, as firms in Illinois that advertise on Google provide lower-quality service. As such, the extant theoretical results require further consideration to understand better the settings in which position auctions will allow consumers to search more efficiently.
While the empirical analysis of this paper has been limited to residential plumbing services, the implications apply more broadly. For instance, Cooper et al. (2001) found that firms that added the ".com" suffix to their names during the Internet boom realized above-market stock price returns, even if the company had no Internet-related business. Post-boom, Cooper et al. (2003) found that firms that removed the ".com" suffix again realized above-market returns, even if their business model did not change materially. Relatedly, corporations often change their names to reflect how they wish to be perceived by the marketplace, such as Kentucky Fried Chicken to KFC, Apple Computer, Inc. to Apple, Inc. and Radio Shack to The Shack. In this paper, the circumstances under which this type of superficial behavior actually sends a meaningful signal to consumers have been considered. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Table 9 : Negative binomial regression in which the dependent variable is the number of complaints filed against the firm with the Better Business Bureau.
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(1) Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Table 10 : Negative binomial regression in which the dependent variable is the number of complaints filed against the firm with the Better Business Bureau and the sample is restricted to firms not serving the metro-Chicago area.
(1) Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Table 11 : Negative binomial regression in which the dependent variable is the number of complaints filed against the firm with the Better Business Bureau and the sample is restricted to firms serving the metroChicago area.
(1) Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Table 14 : Negative binomial regression in which the dependent variable is the number of complaints filed against the firm with the Better Business Bureau.
